

International production, technology diffusion, and trade

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Abstract

The paper develops a general equilibrium model of international production and trade. Technology is carried across borders by multinational producers and the set of technologies being used in a particular country is endogenous. Production locations are chosen based on the costs of production and getting the product to market. A producer may manufacture its product in its home country, target market country, or a third country. Estimated model parameters describe the states of technology in different countries, barriers to international investment, and trade costs. It is found that the barriers to international trade and investment are highly correlated. The model is used to measure the extent of technology diffusion across countries, study the relationship between international production and trade, investigate the effects of free-trade agreements on offshoring, and to quantify the welfare effects of international production and trade.

JEL codes: F15, F17, F21, F23, O33

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1 Introduction

International production is an important feature of the modern economy. It occurs when firms set up production in one or more locations outside of their home countries. This international movement of producers coexists with the international movement of goods and services, with both having the potential to greatly improve world productivity and welfare.

One of the important benefits of international production is the diffusion of technology. A firm establishing production in a foreign country brings along its production technology, thus benefitting the host country. While this benefit is important to all countries, it is especially important to the developing countries that lack productive domestic technologies.

This paper develops a general equilibrium model of international production and trade. In the model, producers may choose to locate production in their home countries or anywhere in the world and they may sell their output anywhere in the world. An important component of the model is the technology transfer associated with multinational production.

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When deciding where to produce, producers shop for a location that gives them the lowest cost of production and getting their product to market. As the result of this choice, a producer may end up making its product in its home country, target market country, or a third country.¹ The same producer may choose different production locations to serve different markets.²

The model incorporates productivity differences across producers. Productivity achieved in production is determined by the technology being used and the ability of a firm to implement this technology. Technology is developed in the home country while the ability of the firm to implement it depends on the location of production.³

Technological differences are probabilistic and described by a statistical distribution, as in Eaton and Kortum (2002). However, while their model has producers drawing productivity in the country where they are located, the model of this paper allows producers to draw productivity in their home country and then bring this technology to the country where they produce. Therefore, this paper extends the methodology of Eaton and Kortum (2002) to include foreign direct investment and the associated technology transfer. This extension endogenizes technology used in production.

Using Eaton-Kortum methodology has several advantages. First, it provides an approach to model producer heterogeneity in a compact, parsimonious way. Second, it allows easy incorporation of trade costs to explain price differences across countries. Third, allowing producer heterogeneity makes it possible to avoid using the Armington's assumption to explain bilateral trade and, in the model of this paper, bilateral foreign direct investment. Compared to computable models that rely on the Armington assumption, the Eaton-Kortum methodology does not require estimation of substitution elasticities between domestic and imported goods and does not give countries monopoly power over their products.

The model yields gravity-like expressions relating bilateral international trade and production to technology, factor costs, implementation factors, and trade costs. The model is parametrized using the average of the 1997-2003 data on bilateral trade and international production in manufactures for the following countries: Canada, Europe, Japan, United States, and the rest of the world (ROW), which is dominated by developing countries, especially China. The estimated parameters include bilateral trade costs, measures of the states of technology and impediments to its implementation. The paper measures the extent of technology diffusion across countries and finds that of the countries in the dataset only Canada uses a significant amount of foreign-sourced technology.

¹The international investment literature distinguishes between the horizontal foreign direct investment (FDI), when firms establish production in foreign countries in order to circumvent trade costs, and vertical FDI, when firms do it in order to take advantage of cheaper inputs. In the latter case, the output of the foreign plant may be sold back to the home country or to a third country (a scenario called export-platform FDI). The model of this paper allows for all of these possibilities.

²Data shows great variability of strategies that multinationals use to serve various markets. From data on the U.S. foreign affiliates, we know that while most of the foreign affiliates' output is typically sold locally (66% of output in an average country), there is significant heterogeneity across host countries (it varies between 22% in Bermuda and 95% in India). The rest of output is sold to the home country and third countries (11% and 23%), but again there is significant heterogeneity (the percentage output sold locally varies between 22% in Bermuda and 95% in India; the percentage sold to the U.S. varies between 0.2% in Greece and 46% in Barbados); It is also interesting to compare two different ways to serve a foreign market: trade and local production, by looking at the ratio of the merchandise exports to the local sales of the foreign affiliates. The most striking feature of this data is how much it varies across countries. Some countries, such as Bermuda (0.08), Poland (0.11), and the U.K. (0.15), are served mostly by multinational production. Other countries, such as Israel (5.5), Costa Rica (2.65), and Korea (2.24), are served mostly through exports (Mataloni and Yorgason, 2002; BEA database).

³Data shows that most of the R&D is done in the home country (87% for the U.S.) (Mataloni and Yorganson, 2002; BEA database).

No a priori restrictions are placed on the parameter values and it is found that the cost of implementing technology in a foreign country is always greater than the cost of implementing it domestically. It is also found that the barriers to international trade and investment are highly correlated across pairs of countries, which explains why high volumes of trade and international production typically go hand-in-hand.

The model is used to perform several counterfactual simulations. The first simulation looks at the effects of a free-trade agreement between the U.S. and ROW on offshoring by the U.S. producers. The politically sensitive topic of offshoring often comes up in discussions of free trade agreements with developing countries. There is a fear that offshoring may grow significantly as the result of free-trade agreements with developing countries, which have much lower wages.

The model is able to provide a quantitative forecast of a maximum possible change in offshoring in response to a free trade agreement between the U.S. and ROW, where the wage is about ten times lower than in the U.S. It is found that the U.S. affiliates in the ROW redirect their output from the local market to the U.S. As the result, their U.S. sales increase dramatically. However, the overall presence of the U.S. affiliates in the ROW diminishes. The paper notes that in reality FTAs typically include provisions that reduce barriers to international production. These reduced barriers, in turn, may lead to greater international production.

Another set of simulations quantifies the welfare gains from international production and trade. It is found that all countries benefit from trade and international production. The magnitudes of the gains from the current levels of trade are similar to those found in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and are greater than the magnitudes of the gains from the current levels of international production.

The paper also quantifies the welfare effects of moving to a world in which international trade is free and producers can establish foreign operations just as easily as they can establish the domestic ones, a scenario called free international production in this paper. The welfare effects of such a move are found to be much greater than the welfare effects of the current levels of international production and trade. For countries that currently have productive domestic technologies, moving to free trade or free international production brings similar welfare gains. The ROW, which represents developing countries, benefits much more from international production than trade.

There are few existing models that combine international production and trade, because of various technical challenges inherent in creating such a model. Markusen, Venables, Konan and Zhang (1996), Yeaple (2003), Keller and Yeaple (2008) create two- or three-country models of various modes of FDI and trade. By comparison, the model of this paper is able to parsimoniously describe a multi-country world where producers engage in various modes of FDI and trade.

There are a number of models that consider different aspects of international production in isolation. These models can be classified into two categories: those that consider producer heterogeneity in productivity and those that do not.

There are models of vertical FDI where firms search for low factor costs. Helpman (1984, 1985) develops such a model without producer heterogeneity. Garetto (2008) incorporates producer heterogeneity. There are several models of the export-platform FDI, all without producer heterogeneity (Hanson, 2001; Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen, 2005).

There are models of horizontal FDI, where firms replicate the same activity in many locations. The models without producer heterogeneity include Markusen (1984) and Markusen and Venables (1998, 2000). The models with producer heterogeneity include Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and Ramondo (2008).

There is also a model of FDI called the knowledge-capital (KK) model (Markusen, 1997;

Markusen, 2002). The central feature of this model is that technology developed at the headquarters of a firm is copied to affiliates in many countries. This feature also exists in the model of this paper.

Then, there are computable general equilibrium (CGE) models of trade that incorporate foreign direct investment. One of the earlier examples is Brown, Deardorff and Stern (1992) that assumed an exogenous amount of FDI in one of its simulations. A more modern example is Dee, Hanslow and Phamduc (2001) that use the FTAP model which is a version of the GTAP model with international production. FTAP extends the Armington methodology by allowing industries/products to be differentiated by both ownership and location of production. Substitution between ownership and location choices is made with exogenous constant elasticity (CES). The model of this paper, by comparison, does not use the Armington assumption and does not require estimation of substitution elasticities for ownership and location choices.

Since this paper studies the magnitudes of international investment barriers, it relates to the existing empirical literature on the topic. This literature includes papers that use the gravity model to studies FDI flows and papers on the proximity-concentration trade-off in international production (Brainard, 1997; Shatz, 2003).

The multi-country model of multinational production and trade by Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2009) (RRC) is the most similar model in the existing literature to the model of this paper.⁴ Both models are extensions of the Eaton-Kortum model of trade. The key difference between the models, which will be elaborated on in the paper, is that the model of this paper imposes fewer restrictions on parameters, especially those associated with the costs of trade and international production.⁵ Another difference between our papers is that their model is parametrized using data on rich OECD countries, while the model of this paper includes the ROW, which represents the developing countries. It allows this paper to study questions that are more applicable to poorer countries, such as the effects of free-trade agreements on offshoring.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the model and Sections 3 describes the data. Section 4 explains the parameter estimation procedure and presents the parameter estimates. Section 5 measures the extent of technology diffusion through international production while Section 6 discusses the estimated trade costs and implementation factors. Section 7 studies the effects of a free-trade agreement on offshoring. Section 8 estimates the welfare effects of trade and international production. Section 9 concludes.

2 Model of international production and trade

There are N countries. In every country there is a continuum of producers, each making a single good indexed by a real number $j \in [0, 1]$. Consumers have CES preferences over the goods. Every product has a blueprint for making it, a result of the R&D effort. Looking at the blueprint, engineers can predict its productivity. This predicted productivity will be called the blueprint productivity and denoted by $z(j) \in (0, \infty)$.

The R&D process is probabilistic and producers draw their blueprint productivities from a

⁴Their model and the model of this paper were developed contemporaneously.

⁵RRC estimate international trade and production costs using cost functions that relate those costs to distance, common language, etc. As the result, their measures of international trade and production costs are positively correlated by design. The model of this paper does not need to use cost functions, so that the international trade and investment costs do not have to be correlated.

statistical distribution. Every country has its own blueprint for making j , so the blueprint productivity of good j in country h is denoted by $z_h(j)$. This productivity is the realization of a random variable Z_h which has a country-specific distribution with cdf F_h^z .⁶

A producer draws its blueprint productivity in its home country, but can manufacture its product anywhere in the world using its blueprint. The same producer may establish production facilities in many countries. Each of these affiliates can then sell its product in many countries around the world.

A producer may serve its home country by manufacturing domestically or manufacturing in a foreign country and selling back to the home country. A producer may serve a foreign country by manufacturing at home and exporting, manufacturing in the target country (horizontal IP), or manufacturing in a third country and exporting to the target market (export-platform IP).

Throughout the paper, the home country of a producer will be denoted by h , the country of production by i , and the country of sale by n .

In order to start production in country i , a producer needs to implement its blueprint there. For various reasons, the productivity achieved in the production of good j may be different from its stated blueprint productivity $z_h(j)$. This difference, called the implementation factor, is affected by the location of production and denoted by $\phi_{ih}(j)$. The productivity achieved in production is $\phi_{ih}(j)z_h(j)$.⁷

While $z_h(j)$ is the productivity predicted by engineers from the blueprint of j , the productivity of the actual production process may end up being higher or lower. Therefore, the implementation factor $\phi_{ih}(j)$ is allowed to vary between 0 and ∞ . If $0 < \phi_{ih}(j) < 1$, the actual productivity is lower than what is projected by the blueprint. If $1 < \phi_{ih}(j) < \infty$, the actual productivity is higher than projected.⁸

The implementation factor varies across goods, which means that blueprints from country h for different goods j will be implemented in country i with different degrees of success. We can say that while the blueprint productivity depends on the strength of the R&D department, the implementation factor depends on the strength of the local management team of a producer.

The implementation process is probabilistic and the implementation factors are drawn from a distribution with cdf F_{ih}^ϕ which is specific to each country pair $\{i, h\}$. A higher mean of this distribution makes country i more attractive to producers from country h . Implementation factors are independent across countries i and h , and across goods j .⁹

⁶This section will not assume specific distributional forms for the random variables, but will derive the results in the general case. Section 2.4 will impose distributional forms and derive the expressions that will be put to data.

⁷This specification is equivalent to using “iceberg” costs for international investment, an approach that has been previously used by the empirical literature on FDI as well as the more recent models of FDI with heterogeneous producers.

⁸The unbounded supports of the distributions of $z(j)$ and $\phi(j)$ mean that the model cannot replicate zero trade or investment flows between countries. Ramondo (2008) and Chor (2010) develop models where zero trade or FDI flows are made possible by bounding the support of the technology distributions. While allowing unbounded supports limits the applicability of the model to large countries or country blocks, it also reduces the complexity of the model and makes it more tractable.

⁹So, the productivity achieved in production is a product of two random variables, z_h and ϕ_{ih} . Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2009), on the other hand, model the productivity achieved in production as a random variable drawn from a multivariate distribution with one dimension representing the home country and the other representing the country of production. Their approach results in many more parameters (than the model of this paper) that need to be estimated, so they have to impose additional restrictions on the parameters. On the other hand, RRC’s approach results in expressions for international production and trade that are more compact than those derived in this paper. Of course, the solutions to their model as well as the model of this paper have to be obtained numerically.

A producer from h that manufactures good j in country i and sells it in country n pays the production cost c_i , trade cost d_{ni} , and sees its blueprint productivity change by $\phi_{ih}(j)$. Therefore, its total cost of this enterprise is $v_{nih}(j) = c_i d_{ni} / \phi_{ih}(j)$. This cost can be thought of as a cost of getting a blueprint to market. Note that $v_{nih}(j)$ is inversely proportional to the implementation factor $\phi_{ih}(j)$, so that a higher $\phi_{ih}(j)$ leads to a lower total cost of getting a blueprint to market. Since ϕ_{ih} is a random variable, v_{nih} is also a random variable with cdf F_{nih}^v .

The production cost c_i consists of the payments for factors and intermediate goods. Assuming that capital and labor are the only factors, and that production function is Cobb-Douglas, the production cost is

$$c_i = r_i^\alpha w_i^\beta p_i^{1-\alpha-\beta}, \quad (1)$$

where α is the share of capital in output, β is the share of labor, and p_i is the price of the intermediate goods bundle.¹⁰

Trade cost has the “iceberg” form. To receive \$1 of product in country n , a producer has to send $d_{ni} \geq 1$ dollars of product from country i . Domestic trade cost is set to one: $d_{nn} \equiv 1$.

Since the goods market has perfect competition, producers set prices equal to their costs. A producer of j from h manufacturing in i and selling in n sets the price $p_{nih}(j) = v_{nih}(j) / z_h(j)$. This producer is successful in n only if it is the lowest-price supplier of j there. Therefore, it chooses a production location i in order to minimize the cost of getting its blueprint of good j to country n . The minimum such cost will be denoted by $v_{nh}(j) = \min_i \{v_{nih}(j)\}$. The price in country n of product j made by an h producer will then be $p_{nh}(j) = v_{nh}(j) / z_h(j)$, which is a random variable with cdf F_{nh}^p .¹¹

Consumers in n buy from the lowest-price supplier of j , so the price of j there is $p_n(j) = \min_h \{p_{nh}(j)\}$, which is a random variable with cdf F_n^p . Since the minimum cost to market $v_{nh}(j)$ is independent across h , the distribution of prices in country n is

$$F_n^p = \Pr(P_n \leq p) = 1 - \Pr(P_{nh} > p, \forall h) = 1 - \prod_h (1 - F_{nh}^p). \quad (2)$$

The CES price index in country n is

$$p_n = E [P_n^{1-\sigma}]^{1/(1-\sigma)} = \left[\int_0^\infty p^{1-\sigma} dF_n^p(p) \right]^{1/(1-\sigma)}. \quad (3)$$

It is assumed that the intermediate goods bundle consists of all goods combined in the CES fashion. Therefore, p_n is also the price of the intermediate goods bundle in (1).

The timing of the model is as follows: each producer draws its blueprint productivity $z_h(j)$ in its home country h , then draws adjustment factors $\phi_{ih}(j)$ for all possible production locations i . Knowing these values, each producer decides whether to produce and where to produce.

¹⁰The assumption of identical factor shares in all countries is of course counterfactual, as shares do vary across countries. However, it is a common assumption in the literature and, as the results in Section 4.1 illustrate, it is not a bad approximation.

¹¹Why cannot ϕ_{ih} be the same for all goods j , same as trade cost d_{ni} ? If ϕ_{ih} were the same for all goods j , then for a given pair of countries $\{n, h\}$ there would have been only one (for all goods j) production location i^* that gives the minimum cost to market (a “knife’s edge” scenario, where several production locations give the same cost to market, is possible, but not realistic). An implication is that for a given pair of countries, there could only be trade or IP (FDI), but not both. In fact, for some country pairs, there could be no trade or investment (all production would take place in a third country). When ϕ_{ih} is random, different producers from h may choose different ways of serving market n .

The following proposition derives the variable that describes the pattern of international production and trade in the model.

Proposition 1 *The probability that a producer from h locates its manufacturing in i in order to supply n with j is*

$$\chi_{nih} = \left[\int_0^\infty \prod_{s \neq h} (1 - F_{ns}^p(p)) dF_{nh}^p(p) \right] \times \left[\int_0^\infty \prod_{s \neq i} (1 - F_{nsh}^v(v)) dF_{nih}^v(v) \right]. \quad (4)$$

Proof. See Appendix A. ■

Since there is a continuum $[0, 1]$ of producers, χ_{nih} is also the fraction of goods that n buys from the i -located h producers. It means that $\sum_h \sum_i \chi_{nih} = 1$. Note that the two integrals in equation (4) are guaranteed to converge because F_{ns}^p and F_{nsh}^v are cdf's of random variables.

2.1 Trade and foreign direct investment

Since χ_{nih} is the fraction of goods that n buys from the i -located h producers, then $X_{nih} = \chi_{nih} X_n$, where X_n is the total spending in n , is equal to the sales in n of the i -located h producers. The total spending in n on the goods manufactured in i , i.e. the volume of imports from i to n , is

$$\Pi_{ni} = \pi_{ni} X_n, \quad (5)$$

where

$$\pi_{ni} = \sum_s \chi_{nis} \quad (6)$$

is the probability that a producer located in i (of any origin h) is the least-price supplier in n .¹² Note that the definition of π_{ni} means that $\sum_s \pi_{ns} = 1$.¹³

Total sales of the affiliates of h located in i are

$$S_{ih} = \sum_n (\chi_{nih} X_n). \quad (7)$$

Note that for given i and h , events A_{nih} are not mutually exclusive across n 's. Some affiliates sell to just one country while others sell to many countries. So, the probabilities χ_{nih} cannot be added up across n , but the dollar amounts can.¹⁴

The stock of foreign direct investment is derived from the sales of foreign affiliates S_{ih} . Let κ_{ih} be the fraction of capital stock in i that is owned by the producers from h . Then, the stock of foreign direct investment in i owned by the h producers is $\kappa_{ih} K_i$. Let λ_{ih} be the fraction of the

¹²Note that for given n and i , events A_{nih} across different h 's are mutually exclusive. In other words, two producers from any two locations h_1 and h_2 cannot establish manufacturing facilities in the same location i in order to supply the same product j to the same market n . Therefore χ_{nih} are additive across origins h . Also, for given n and h events A_{nih} across different i 's are mutually exclusive, since a producer from h would not establish affiliates in more than one location i in order to supply the same market n . Therefore χ_{nih} is additive across production locations i .

¹³It is also possible to derive the volume of sales of h producers (manufacturing anywhere in the world) in n . Let $\chi_{nh} = \sum_s \chi_{nsh}$ be the probability that a producer from h (manufacturing anywhere in the world) sells in n . Therefore, $\chi_{nh} X_n$ is the volume of sales of h firms in n . The expression for χ_{nh} simplifies considerably. The second term in the expression for χ_{nih} disappears, and the probability that a producer from h (manufacturing anywhere) is the least-price supplier in n is simply $\chi_{nh} \equiv \Pr(p_{nh}(j) \leq \min_s \{p_{ns}(j), s \neq h\})$.

¹⁴So $\sum_n \chi_{nih}$ is not a probability that a firm located in i has come from h (or a fraction of firms located in i that has come from h), because some affiliates may sell to more than one destination.

labor force in i employed by the producers from h . These definitions of κ_{ih} and λ_{ih} mean that $\sum_s \kappa_{is} = \sum_s \lambda_{is} = 1$.

Then, note that the distribution of the production efficiencies $\phi_{ih}z_h$ of the producers that are actually producing in i is the same regardless of their origin h . In other words, conditioning on the origin h does not affect the distribution of $\phi_{ih}z_h$. A country h with a higher state of technology and lower barriers to investment in i will increase the number of affiliates in i until the distribution of their efficiencies is the same as that of the affiliates from the other countries (and that of i 's domestic producers).

The above means that the average (across producers) capital-output ratio (and also the labor-output ratio) is the same for any origin h . This allows us to relate κ_{ih} and λ_{ih} to the sales of foreign affiliates:

$$\kappa_{ih} = \lambda_{ih} = \frac{S_{ih}}{Q_i} = \frac{1}{Q_i} \sum_n (\chi_{nih} X_n), \quad (8)$$

where Q_i is country i 's output. Therefore, both κ_{ih} and λ_{ih} measure the ownership structure of a country's producers.

Equation (5) is a gravity-like equation for international trade because it relates trade to country characteristics and trade costs. Equation (8) is a gravity-like equation for FDI because it relates FDI to country characteristics and the implementation factors, which can be interpreted as barriers to investment.

2.2 Market clearing

Due to data limitations, only the manufacturing industries are modeled. Model closure follows the usual practice. In each country i , output must equal spending:

$$Q_i = \sum_{n=1}^N \pi_{ni} X_n. \quad (9)$$

Manufacturing goods can be used as either final or intermediate goods. Therefore, $X_n = Z_n + C_n$, where Z_n is the spending on the intermediate manufacturing goods and C_n is the spending on the final manufacturing goods. The latter is assumed to be a fixed portion of a country's income: $C_n = \varphi_n Y_n$. The former is given by the production function: $Z_n = (1 - \alpha - \beta) Q_n$. Putting these expressions together we obtain the equation for total spending:

$$X_n = (1 - \alpha - \beta) Q_n + \varphi_n Y_n. \quad (10)$$

Country income is the sum of capital income and labor income in manufacturing, and non-manufacturing income. It is assumed that capital income is not repatriated to the headquarters. This assumption is made for two reasons: (a) to make the technology transfer the only transfer associated with FDI, so the focus stays on it and (b) to make the model more similar to Eaton and Kortum (2002) where income stays in the country of production.

The total income in n is

$$Y_n = w_n L_n + r_n K_n + Y_n^o, \quad (11)$$

where Y_n^o is the nonmanufacturing income. Following Eaton and Kortum (2002), the nonmanufacturing income is considered fixed.

Factor stocks K_n and L_n are specific to manufacturing. Capital and labor are not mobile between the manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors. Factor markets are perfectly competitive.

Factor employments are given by¹⁵

$$K_n = \alpha Q_n / r_n \text{ and } L_n = \beta Q_n / w_n. \quad (12)$$

Model parameters are K_n , L_n , Y_n^o , Λ_n , Ψ_{ih} , θ , d_{ni} , α , β , σ , and φ_n , while the endogenous variables are π_{ni} , κ_{ih} , Q_n , X_n , w_n , r_n , and p_n . Section 2.4 will impose specific distributional forms on the random variables in order to make the model operational. Section 4 will describe how parameter values are assigned.

2.3 Affiliate strategies

Producers have many strategies available to them from which to choose the most cost-efficient ones to serve various markets. These strategies include exporting, local production, and export-platform IP. How do various parameters of the model affect the incentives of producers to choose one strategy over another?

When deciding how to serve a particular market n , a producer considers the cost of implementing its blueprint, cost of production, and cost of delivering the manufactured good to market. A producer will be a domestic exporter if the domestic implementation factor is high, domestic production cost is low, and the trade cost to market n is low. On the other hand, if the trade cost to market n is high, the implementation factor in n is high (which is more likely if Ψ_{nh} is high), and the cost of production in n is low then the best strategy will be to set up a foreign affiliate in n and sell output locally, i.e. engage in horizontal IP.

It may be possible, though, that the trade cost from the home country to n is high, but the implementation factor in n is low or the cost of production there is high. In that case a producer will look for a country close to n with a high implementation factor and low production cost in order to establish production there and export output to n . This affiliate will then be engaged in export-platform IP.

Everything else equal, low trade costs d_{ni} will encourage imports into n , while high trade costs will encourage horizontal IP there (“tariff jumping”). High implementation factors in n (high Ψ_{nh}) and low production costs c_n will encourage producers to set up manufacturing in n . Low costs of shipping goods from n to other countries will encourage producers to use n as the platform for the export-oriented IP.

How do producer characteristics relate to the producer’s mode of operation? For example, which producers will engage in trade and IP and which will only sell on the domestic market? Both trade and IP involve additional costs compared to domestic production and sales. Therefore, more productive producers are more likely to be competitive in foreign markets. So, more productive producers are more likely to engage in trade and/or IP. Also, more productive producers will serve more markets than less productive ones.¹⁶ These properties of the model match the observed producer facts.¹⁷

¹⁵When the model is simulated (as in Section 7), the model parameters are K_n , L_n , Y_n^o , Λ_n , Ψ_{ih} , θ , d_{ni} , α , β , σ , and φ_n , while the endogenous variables are π_{ni} , κ_{ih} , Q_n , X_n , w_n , r_n , and p_n .

¹⁶Because some markets n are more expensive to serve than others, more productive producers will be competitive in more markets than less productive producers.

¹⁷There is a large literature that looks at producer-level heterogeneity in trade. This literature finds that exporters are a minority and more productive than non-exporters. More productive exporters sell to more destinations than less productive exporters (Aw, Chung and Roberts, 1998; Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998; Bernard and Jensen, 1999; Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz, 2004).

Of those producers that do serve foreign countries, which will engage in horizontal IP and which will be exporters? For a producer from h the decision whether to export to i or establish an affiliate there comes down to which option will give a lower price of its good in i . If a producer were to export to i , the price for its good in i would be $p_{ihh}^{export}(j) = c_h d_{ih} / \phi_{hh}(j) z_h(j)$.¹⁸ If this producer were to set up an affiliate in i , the price for its good would be $p_{iih}^{IP}(j) = c_i / \phi_{ih}(j) z_h(j)$. The ratio of these prices is

$$\frac{p_{ihh}^{export}(j)}{p_{iih}^{IP}(j)} = \frac{c_h / \phi_{hh}(j)}{c_i / \phi_{ih}(j)} d_{ih}. \quad (13)$$

If this ratio is greater than one, then local production is a better option. If it is less than one, then trade is better. The ratio depends on the cost of production in h relative to i , implementation factor in i relative to h , and the cost of bringing a good from h to i .

Can we say something about the productivity of the producers that choose to export vs. those that choose IP? We can if we make an assumption that exporting is cheaper than IP for most producers and most destinations (Section 4.1 shows that this assumption holds for the countries in this paper's dataset). In this case, a producer is more likely to engage in exports than IP (and more producers engage in exports than IP). This means that a producer serving more destinations is more likely to serve some of them through IP than a producer serving fewer destinations.¹⁹ Since more productive producers serve more destinations, they are more likely to engage in IP than less productive producers. This matches the observed fact that producers that engage in IP are, on average, more productive than those that only export.²⁰

It is also interesting to consider the choice between domestic production and offshoring when supplying the domestic market. If a producer from h wanting to supply its good to its home market were to manufacture the good domestically, its price would be $p_{hhh}^{dom}(j) = c_h / \phi_{hh}(j) z_h(j)$. If instead the manufacturing took place at an offshore affiliate in i , the price (in country h) would be $p_{hih}^{offshore}(j) = c_h d_{hi} / \phi_{ih}(j) z_h(j)$. The ratio of these prices is

$$\frac{p_{hhh}^{dom}(j)}{p_{hih}^{offshore}(j)} = \frac{c_h / \phi_{hh}(j)}{c_i / \phi_{ih}(j)} \frac{1}{d_{hi}}. \quad (14)$$

If this ratio is greater than one, then offshoring is a better option. Otherwise, domestic production is better. Similarly to (13), this ratio depends on cost of production in h relative to i and the implementation factor in i relative to h . However, the trade cost is now in the denominator rather than numerator. Therefore, it will always be the case that $p_{ihh}^{export}(j) / p_{iih}^{IP}(j) \geq p_{hhh}^{dom}(j) / p_{hih}^{offshore}(j)$. An h -producer that prefers to offshore its manufacturing to i in order to supply h will also use its affiliate in i to supply the local market. An h -producer that is actually engaged in offshoring to supply h (being the least-price supplier of j in h) will also engage in local production and sales of j in i . Section 4.1 continues this analysis in view of the estimated parameter values.

¹⁸The superscript "export" is not necessary, but is added for convenience.

¹⁹Similarly, of the firms that serve a specific number of destinations, the fraction of pure exporters (not engaged in IP) declines as the number of destinations rises.

²⁰There are several studies of producer heterogeneity in international production. They find that only a small fraction of firms engage in FDI and that these firms are more productive than the exporting firms (Helpman et al., 2004; Tomiura, 2007).

2.4 Imposing distributional forms

As in Eaton and Kortum (2002), it is assumed that the productivity draws $z_h(j) > 0$ have the Fréchet distribution with the shaping parameter θ and location parameter Λ_h . The cdf of z_h is therefore $F_h^z(z) = e^{-\Lambda_h z^{-\theta}}$, where θ is common across countries while Λ_h is different.²¹ Parameter Λ_h measures the state of the domestically-sourced technology in each country.

It is assumed that implementation factors $\phi_{ih}(j) > 0$ are also distributed Fréchet.²² The cdf of ϕ_{ih} is $F_{ih}^\phi(\phi) = e^{-\Psi_{ih}\phi^{-\mu}}$, where the shaping parameter μ is the same across country pairs while the location parameter Ψ_{ih} is different. If ϕ_{ih} is distributed Fréchet, then $v_{nih} = c_i d_{ni} / \phi_{ih}$ has the Weibull distribution with cdf $F_{nih}^v = 1 - e^{-\check{\Psi}_{nih} v^\mu}$, where $\check{\Psi}_{nih} = \Psi_{ih} (c_i d_{ni})^{-\mu}$.

The price $p_{nh}(j) = v_{nh}(j)/z_h(j)$ is the product of two independent (not necessarily identically distributed) Weibull random variables (v_{nh} and $\tilde{z}_h = 1/z_h$, since the inverse of a Fréchet r.v. is a Weibull r.v.). This product is itself a random variable with cdf $F_{nh}^p(p) = R(p; \mu, \theta, \check{\Psi}_{nh}, \Lambda_h)$ and pdf $f_{nh}^p(p) = r(p; \mu, \theta, \check{\Psi}_{nh}, \Lambda_h)$, where functions $R(\cdot)$ and $r(\cdot)$ will be shown below. The distribution of this random variable is derived by Sagias, Karagiannidis, Mathiopoulous and Tsiftsis (2006), Sagias and Tombras (2007), and Bithas, Sagias, Tsiftsis and Karagiannidis (2007).²³

To make the numerical analysis workable, it is assumed that the shaping parameters of the distributions of v_{nih} and \tilde{z}_h are the same. When $\mu = \theta$ the cdf and pdf of p_{nh} are

$$F_{nh}^p(p) = R(p; \theta, \theta, \check{\Psi}_{nh}, \Lambda_h) = 1 - 2 \left(\check{\Psi}_{nh} \Lambda_h \right)^{1/2} p^{\theta/2} K_1 \left(2 \left(\check{\Psi}_{nh} \Lambda_h \right)^{1/2} p^{\theta/2} \right) \quad (15)$$

and

$$f_{nh}^p(p) = r(p; \theta, \theta, \check{\Psi}_{nh}, \Lambda_h) = 2 \check{\Psi}_{nh} \Lambda_h \theta p^{\theta-1} K_0 \left(2 \left(\check{\Psi}_{nh} \Lambda_h \right)^{1/2} p^{\theta/2} \right), \quad (16)$$

where $K_q(\cdot)$ is the q th order modified Bessel function of the second kind.

Prices in each country are distributed with cdf

$$F_n^p(p) = 1 - \prod_s 2 \left(\check{\Psi}_{ns} \Lambda_s \right)^{1/2} p^{\theta/2} K_1 \left(2 \left(\check{\Psi}_{ns} \Lambda_s \right)^{1/2} p^{\theta/2} \right) \quad (17)$$

which has the corresponding pdf

$$f_n^p(p) = \sum_i \left\{ 2 \check{\Psi}_{ni} \Lambda_i \theta p^{\theta-1} K_0 \left(2 \left(\check{\Psi}_{ni} \Lambda_i \right)^{1/2} p^{\theta/2} \right) \prod_{s \neq i} \left[2 \left(\check{\Psi}_{ns} \Lambda_s \right)^{1/2} p^{\theta/2} K_1 \left(2 \left(\check{\Psi}_{ns} \Lambda_s \right)^{1/2} p^{\theta/2} \right) \right] \right\} \quad (18)$$

derived in the technical appendix (available upon request). The CES prices index in country n is given by equation (3).

²¹The mean and variance of a Fréchet random variable are $E[z] = \Lambda^{1/\theta} \Gamma\left(1 - \frac{1}{\theta}\right)$, for $\theta > 1$ and $Var(z) = \Lambda^{2/\theta} \left[\Gamma\left(1 - \frac{2}{\theta}\right) - \Gamma^2\left(1 - \frac{1}{\theta}\right) \right]$, for $\theta > 2$, where Γ is the Gamma function.

²²The technology being used to make good j and the implementation procedure for this technology both represent best available practices. Therefore, it is reasonable to represent them by extreme-value distributions.

²³Note that a product of two Weibull random variables cannot be approximated by a Weibull random variable (Sagias and Tombras, 2007).

Proposition 2 *The probability that a producer from h would establish production in i in order to supply n is given by*

$$\begin{aligned} \chi_{nih} &= 2^N \theta \check{\Psi}_{nih}^2 \check{\Psi}_{nh}^{-1} \Lambda_h \prod_{s \neq h} \left(\check{\Psi}_{is} \Lambda_s \right)^{1/2} \times \\ &\quad \times \int_0^\infty p^{\theta(N+1)/2-1} K_0 \left(2 \left(\check{\Psi}_{nh} \Lambda_h \right)^{1/2} p^{\theta/2} \right) \prod_{s \neq h} K_1 \left(2 \left(\check{\Psi}_{is} \Lambda_s \right)^{1/2} p^{\theta/2} \right) dp. \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

Proof. See Appendix B. ■

3 Data

The dataset includes 5 “countries”: Canada, Europe (which includes France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and UK), Japan, United States, and the rest of the world (denoted by ROW and dominated by China).²⁴ Because of the availability of data, only the manufacturing sector is considered. The following data was collected: output, value added, total exports, total imports, employment, labor compensation, and bilateral trade from the World Bank’s Trade and Production database, total country GDP from the World Bank’s WDI database, and employment by foreign affiliates from the OECD’s Globalization database. Data is typically the average of several (2-3) years around 2000.²⁵

Table 1 shows the country-level data. Note that the ROW’s manufacturing output is similar to that of the U.S. and Europe, but its employment is an order of magnitude higher and its wage is an order of magnitude lower.

Table 2 shows domestic and international trade, Π_{ni} . Domestic trade (domestic spending on domestic goods, shown on the diagonal of the table) is much larger than international trade (shown on the off-diagonal entries). Note that each row adds up to the total spending of the importer and each column to the total output of the exporter.

Table 3 shows the same data, but as a fraction of the total spending of the importer (so each row adds up to one), π_{ni} . The fraction of the domestic goods in total spending varies between 0.47 in Canada and 0.89 in Japan. Table 4 also shows the same trade data, but as a fraction of the total output of the exporter. It clearly shows the significance of the U.S. market for Canadian firms: they sell 47% of their output on the domestic market and 45% on the U.S. market. Tables 3 and 4 show that Japan is the most closed economy of the five. The weight of its domestic trade in its total spending or output is greater than for any other country. We can also see that Canada is the most open economy of the five.

²⁴Most of international production occurs in developed countries: 70% of the world FDI inflows is received by industrial countries and 70% of the U.S. MOFAs (by output) are in the G7 countries (UNCTAD, 2004, 2005; Mataloni and Yorgason, 2002; BEA database).

²⁵The size of international production can be measured in several ways. It can be measured by the cumulative investment made by the MNCs into their affiliates. This measure is called the stock of FDI and is calculated from the annual FDI flows reported in national accounts. The size of IP can also be measured by the output, sales, employment, or reported assets of the affiliates. There are advantage and disadvantage to using each of these measures. FDI flows are available for a wide range of countries and years, but are volatile and may be inaccurate because investments are often routed through the third countries. Industry distribution of FDI may be inaccurate for a similar reason: investments are often routed through holding companies in other industries. In addition, the FDI stocks reported by statistical agencies do not take into account changes in asset and currency values. The data on affiliates’ output, sales, employment, and assets is collected by industrial surveys and reflects ownership and industry more accurately than FDI flows. However, this data is available for only a few countries and years.

Table 5 shows the employment in each of the five countries classified by the country of ownership of the enterprise. This employment data shows the extent of the domestic and international production activities of the firms. Domestic production (measured by the number of workers employed by domestic firms, shown on the diagonal of the table) is much larger than international production (measured by the number of workers employed by foreign firms, shown on the off-diagonal entries). The sum of each row is the total employment in each country. The sum of each column is the total employment at all the firms from that country.

Table 6 shows the same data, but as a fraction of the total employment in each country (so that each row adds up to one). This is the ownership structure of each country's producers, previously defined as λ_{ih} . It shows that domestic firms employ between 71% (in Canada) and 98% (in Japan) of the labor force. There is a substantial presence of the U.S. firms in Canada: they employ 21% of the Canadian workers. The U.S. firms employ about 6% of all workers in Europe and European firms employ about 6% of all U.S. workers.

Very few Japanese workers are employed by foreign firms. For example, the U.S. firms employ only 0.8% of the Japanese workers. While a good number of workers are employed by foreign firms in the rest of the world, their number is small relative to the total workforce there. European firms employ 3% of the ROW's workforce, while the U.S. firms employ 2%.

Table 7 also shows the employment data, but this time as a fraction of the total employment by each country's firms (so that each column adds up to one). The table shows that for all the countries except the ROW, a significant part of the economic activity of their firms takes place outside the national borders. For example, only 77% of workers employed by the U.S. firms are American. The table also shows that the ROW's workers constitute a significant percentage of the workforce of each country's firms. For example, 14% of the workers employed by the U.S. firms are located in the ROW.

4 Parameter estimation

We begin by identifying parameters Ψ_{ih} , d_{ni} , and Λ_h . The parameters are identified by fitting gravity-type equations (5) and (8) to data:

$$\pi_{ni} = \sum_s \chi_{nis}, \quad n \neq i, \quad (20)$$

$$\lambda_{ih} = \frac{\sum_n (\chi_{nih} X_n)}{Q_i}, \quad (21)$$

with χ_{nih} given by (19).^{26,27}

Spending X_n , output Q_n , trade π_{ni} , ownership structure λ_{ih} , and wages w_n are taken from data. Capital share α is set to 0.105, labor share β to 0.195, and (gross) rates of return r_n to 20%

²⁶Note that the market clearing conditions $Q_i = \sum_{n=1}^N \pi_{ni} X_n$ are implied by equations (21). This can be seen by taking the sum of (21) over h and remembering that $\pi_{ni} = \sum_h \chi_{nih}$, and $\sum_h \lambda_{ih} = 1$.

²⁷Note that while equations (20) and (21) are solved as a system, the trade costs are primarily identified from equation (20) (since it sums over the sources of technology s), while implementation factors are primarily identified from equation (21) (since it sums over the destination of exports n). Therefore, trade costs are primarily determined by trade flows, while implementation factors are primarily determined by the size of international production.

in every country.²⁸ The value of elasticity σ used to calculate the CES price index is set to 5.²⁹

The value of the shaping parameter θ is set to 8. This is the value estimated in Eaton and Kortum (2002) using price data. Changing the value of θ affects the estimated parameter values in the manner similar to Eaton and Kortum (2002). Setting a lower θ increases estimated trade costs d_{ni} and decreases estimated parameters of the implementation factors' distributions Ψ_{ih} (so lower θ results in higher estimated trade and IP costs).^{30,31} The next section presents the estimated values of Λ_h , Ψ_{ih} , and d_{ni} for $\theta = 8$.

The system of equations (20)-(21) contains $2N^2 - N$ equations. The number of parameters to be identified is the following. It was previously assumed that domestic trade is free, i.e. $d_{nn} \equiv 1$. It is also assumed that $\Psi_{hh} \equiv 1$. Therefore, there are $N \times (N - 1)$ parameters d_{ni} , $N \times (N - 1)$ parameters Ψ_{ih} , and N parameters Λ_h that need to be identified. The total number of these parameters is $2N^2 - N$.³²

4.1 Results

Since there are 5 countries, there are $2N^2 - N = 45$ parameters to be identified from the same number of equations. Table 8 shows each country's estimated mean blueprint productivity, normalized with respect to the U.S. This mean productivity is calculated as $(\Lambda_h/\Lambda_{US})^{1/\theta}$. We can see that Japan has a slightly higher state of technology than the U.S., while Europe and Canada have lower states. The ROW has a much lower state of technology than the other countries.

Table 9 shows the estimated mean implementation factors, calculated as $\Psi_{ih}^{1/\theta}$. The table shows owner countries in columns and host countries in rows. For example, the mean implementation factor for the U.S. firms operating in Canada is 0.74.

All mean international implementation factors are smaller than one, i.e. smaller than the mean domestic implementation factors. This indicates that producers are, on average, more efficient when they manufacture goods at home than abroad. Of course, cheaper costs of production and trade can still entice producers to move their operations abroad even when the implementation factors are less than one.

The producers from Canada, Europe, and the U.S. operating in the ROW have very small (0.3-0.4) mean implementation factors. Since the ROW is dominated by developing countries, especially China, producers operating there have to deal with poor infrastructure, unfriendly governments,

²⁸The share of intermediate goods in output is then 0.7. The implied shares of capital and labor in value added are 0.35 and 0.65. The 20% gross rate of return assumes a 10% net return and 10% depreciation rate.

²⁹The value of parameter σ has a negligible effect on the parameter estimates or simulation results. For example, choosing a σ between 1.1 and 10 changes the relative price levels by less than 1%.

³⁰Lower θ results in higher variance of the technology distribution, thus increasing the probability that a country has a producer that can be competitive in foreign markets. To fit the existing trade and IP values, the model offsets this effect by setting higher trade and IP costs.

³¹The simulation results presented in this paper are robust to the value of θ . Consider, for example, two cases: (a) a low θ and the corresponding high estimates of d_{ni} , $n \neq i$ and (b) a high θ and the corresponding low estimates of d_{ni} , $n \neq i$. Then, in each case, consider performing a counterfactual experiment that sets $d_{ni} = 1$, $\forall n, i$ (i.e. free trade). Such an experiment is performed in Section 8.2. As in Eaton and Kortum (2002), parameter θ determines the response of trade flows to changes in trade costs: higher θ means smaller response. So, moving to free trade results in approximately the same predicted changes of trade flows in both cases. In case (a), changes in trade costs are large, but trade flows are not sensitive to changes in trade costs. In case (b), changes in trade costs are small, but trade flows are very sensitive to changes in trade costs. Welfare changes are also approximately similar in both cases since they are a function of the changes in trade. The same logic applies to simulating free IP and autarky.

³²Note that this is not an econometric estimation. There are zero degrees of freedom.

etc., which make the implementation factors there very low. On the other hand, producers from the ROW operating in the other countries have implementation factors that are quite high. While they have to deal with all the usual issues of establishing production abroad, they often face more favorable business conditions in the foreign countries than at home.

Besides the ROW producers, high implementation factors are enjoyed by the U.S. firms operating in Canada, and by European and Canadian firms operating in the U.S. The high implementation factors between the U.S. and Canada are not surprising since NAFTA contains many provisions designed to facilitate FDI. Comparing host countries, we can see that the highest implementation factors are in the United States, which means that it provides a good environment for foreign producers.

Producers trying to establish production in Japan and Japanese producers trying to establish production abroad face low implementation factors. Much has been written about the difficulties encountered by the non-Japanese firms trying to operate in Japan, so their low implementation factors are not surprising. The low implementation factors of the Japanese producers operating abroad are less expected. Perhaps they can be explained by management style differences or some other business culture-related factors.

Looking at the technology parameters and implementation factors, we can ask the following question: can the average producer from a country drawing the average implementation factor in a foreign country be competitive with the average producer of the host country? Both producers face the same production and trade costs. The only difference is the productivity with which they operate.

For each country pair, Table 10 shows the production productivity of the average producer from country h (shown in columns) operating in country i (shown in rows), drawing the corresponding average implementation factor. This production productivity is equal to $(\Psi_{ih}\Lambda_h/\Lambda_{US})^{1/\theta}$. For example the average producer from Europe operating in Canada would draw the blueprint productivity of 0.95 and the implementation factor of 0.62 resulting in the productivity of $0.95 \times 0.62 \approx 0.58$. The diagonal entries show the productivities of the average domestic producers (since the average domestic implementation factors are one).

Table 10 shows that the production productivities are such that in every country the average domestic producer has an advantage over the average foreign producers drawing the average implementation factors. This implies that to be successful in a foreign country, a producer must either have a blueprint productivity that is better than his home country's average or draw an implementation factor that is better than average. The former can be achieved by having a better than average R&D department and the latter by having better than average managers.

Table 11 shows the estimated trade costs. The average trade cost across all 20 country pairs is 1.65 (the tariff equivalent of this cost is 65%). This is similar to a typical international trade cost roughly estimated by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) to be 0.74%. The lowest trade costs are between the U.S. and Canada (17% and 35% tariff equivalents) and between Europe and the ROW (24% and 33%). The highest trade costs are faced by the Japanese producers selling to Europe and Canada (114% and 122%).³³

The rest of the model parameters: country labor and capital endowments L_i and K_i , share of

³³The model estimates high export trade costs for Japan because of low import shares for Japanese manufactures shown in Table 3. For example, the share of Japanese manufactures in the Europe is 0.015, which is about a half of the U.S.'s share (0.031). Since the Japan has a slightly higher average productivity than the U.S. (Table 8) and lower manufacturing wage than the U.S. (Table 1), its low share in Europe is explained by high trade costs.

manufacturing in country spending φ_i , and nonmanufacturing income Y_i^o , are easy to calculate. Because of the assumption of equal labor shares across countries, the labor stocks L_n are calculated as $L_n = \beta Q_n / w_n$ instead of being taken from data. These calculated labor stocks, shown in Table 12 are very similar to the ones in the data with the correlation being 0.998. The capital stocks are calculated as $K_n = \alpha Q_n / r_n$.

Preference parameters φ_n are calculated as $\varphi_n = C_n / Y_n$, where C_n is the spending on final goods and Y_n is the GDP. Spending on final goods is calculated as total spending minus spending on intermediate goods: $C_n = X_n - (1 - \alpha - \beta) Q_n$, while GDP is taken from data. The nonmanufacturing income is calculated as $Y_n^o = Y_n - w_n L_n - r_n K_n$. Table 12 presents the values of the calculated preference parameters φ_n . It shows that manufacturing makes up about 10 to 15% of each country's spending. The calculated manufacturing shares in GDP are very similar to those in the data (within 0.4 percentage points).

4.2 Model vs. data

It was mentioned in the introduction to this paper that the percentage of output of the U.S. foreign affiliates that is sold locally varies significantly from country to country. We can now examine what the model has to say about the size of local sales. Remember that when parametrizing the model, we only used the data on the total employment of affiliates located in each country. We did not use the data on how much of the affiliates' output is sold locally. The model, however, can infer the percentage of output sold locally. It is equal to $\chi_{iih} X_i / \sum_n \chi_{nih} X_n$, where $n, i \neq h$.

Figure 1 shows the local sales of the U.S. affiliates predicted by the model as percentages their total sales (output) in each country. Similarly to the BEA data mentioned in the introduction, this figure shows a good deal of variation across countries.

It would be interesting to compare these model predictions to data. Of all the countries in the dataset, there is only data on the size of the local sales for the U.S. affiliates in Canada and Japan.³⁴ The percentage of the U.S. affiliates' output sold locally in Canada is predicted by the model to be 61%, while the data shows it to be 55%. In Japan, the model predicts the fraction of output sold locally to be 96%, while it is 90% in the data. The numbers are close, but the model overpredicts the size of the local sales somewhat.³⁵

4.3 Pattern of international production

While the data used to parametrize the model contains information on the total sales of foreign affiliates, the model is able to infer the sales of foreign affiliates by destination. This information is contained in χ_{nih} , which is a $5 \times 5 \times 5$ matrix. It would be interesting to summarize the pattern of international production inferred by the model for the countries in the dataset.

We start by noting that in most countries of the dataset, the largest fraction of total spending goes toward the output of the domestic affiliates of the domestic firms. For an average country, this fraction, χ_{nnn} , is equal to 0.63. It varies between 0.29 in Canada and 0.88 in Japan. Canada is an interesting case, where $\chi_{CAN,US,US} > \chi_{CAN,CAN,CAN}$ (i.e. Canadians spend more on the output of

³⁴We cannot simply add up the local sales in the European or ROW countries to obtain the local sales of the U.S. affiliates in Europe and the ROW. Consider, for example, the sales of the U.S. affiliates located in France to Italy. These sales are local sales for Europe, but will be classified as sales to third countries in the BEA's data.

³⁵Changing the value of parameter θ has a negligible effect on the percentages inferred by the model.

the U.S. affiliates of the U.S. firms than on the output of the Canadian affiliates of the Canadian firms).³⁶

The second-largest fraction of spending in a typical country of the dataset goes toward the output of the affiliates of foreign firms that produce in their home countries. This fraction is χ_{nhh} and it varies between $\chi_{JAP,CAN,CAN} = 0.0015$ and $\chi_{CAN,US,US} = 0.34$. For the average country in the dataset, it is equal to 0.065.

The third-largest fraction of a typical country's spending goes toward the output of the local affiliates of foreign firms. This fraction is χ_{nnh} and it varies between $\chi_{JAP,JAP,CAN} = 0.00024$ and $\chi_{CAN,CAN,US} = 0.13$. For the average country in the dataset, it is equal to 0.022.

This pattern, in which $\chi_{nhh} > \chi_{nnh}$ (i.e. h -producers prefer to serve n through trade rather than local production), holds for most countries in the dataset. The exceptions include U.S.-Europe international production (as mentioned in the previous section), where $\chi_{EUR,EUR,US} > \chi_{EUR,US,US}$ and $\chi_{US,US,EUR} > \chi_{US,EUR,EUR}$.

The rest of countries' expenditures is on the output of the affiliates that operate in third countries (i.e. as export platforms). It is interesting to consider how the export-platform locations are selected. Are they chosen primarily because of their proximity to the destination of output, high implementation factors, or low costs of production? To answer this question, for each pair of home and destination countries h and n , we will look at all the possible production locations i ($i \neq h$, $i \neq n$) and find the location from which the h -affiliates sell the greatest amount of output to n (i.e. the location i for which χ_{nih} is the greatest). Then, we will check if this location is associated with the lowest trade cost to n (i.e. lowest d_{ni}), highest implementation factors for h -affiliates (highest Ψ_{ih}), or lowest production costs c_i .

It turns out that for the countries in the dataset, most of the favorite export-platform locations offer the lowest trade cost to the destination market. Highest implementation factors are associated with the second-largest number of favorite export-platform locations. Only ROW is chosen as the favorite export-platform location because of low production costs. The differences in the production costs between the other countries in the dataset are too small to be the decisive factors in selecting the location of export-platform affiliates.³⁷

4.4 Affiliate strategies revisited

Section 2.3 discussed the choice of producers between exporting to a destination vs. setting up production there. It was said that if exporting is cheaper than setting up production for most producers and most destination, then more producers will engage in exports than IP and those producers that engage in IP will, on average, be more productive than exporters. We can now check if exporting is indeed cheaper than IP for most producers and most destinations in the dataset.

We will calculate the price that a producer from h expects to receive if it exports its goods to

³⁶Unfortunately, this result cannot be compared against data because Statistics Canada does not report data on the operations of foreign affiliates in Canada. Also, note that this result does not mean that Canada's imports are greater than its output, because Canadian output includes the output of foreign affiliates located in Canada, which is substantial.

³⁷This means, for example, that producers do not choose an export-platform location to serve the ROW based on the lowest cost of production.

i relative to the price that it expects to receive if it sets up production in i :

$$E \left[\frac{p_{ihh}^{export}}{p_{iih}^{IP}} \right] = \frac{c_h/E[\phi_{hh}]}{c_i/E[\phi_{ih}]} d_{ih} = \frac{c_h}{c_i} \Psi_{ih}^{1/\theta} d_{ih}. \quad (22)$$

This ratio depends on the relative cost of production in h and i , average implementation factor faced by an h producer in i , and the cost of bringing goods from h to i . The relative costs of production for each pair of countries are shown in Table 13, where i is a row and h is a column. It shows that for Canada, Europe, Japan, and the U.S. the relative costs of production are within 15% of each other. On the other hand, the costs of production in those countries are, on average, 50% greater than in ROW. Average implementation factors were shown in Table 9 and trade costs in Table 11. We can see in Table 9 that the low cost of production in the ROW is offset by the low implementation factors there.³⁸

Table 14 shows the ratio of the expected prices $E \left[p_{ihh}^{export} / p_{iih}^{IP} \right]$. Out of the 20 country pairs only 3 have this ratio greater than one. For those pairs of countries, IP gives a lower expected price than exporting. For example, the U.S. producers targeting the European market and the European producers targeting the U.S. market will, on average, find that setting up production in the target market gives them a lower price than exporting. The same is true for the Canadian producers targeting the European market. For the vast majority (17 out of 20) of country pairs, exporting to a destination will, on average, give a lower price than setting up production in the target market. Therefore, the assumption made in Section 2.3 that exporting is cheaper than setting up local production for most producers and most destination holds for the countries in the dataset.

Section 2.3 also discussed the choice between domestic production and offshoring. We can now calculate the price that a producer from h expects to receive if it produces a good domestically relative to the price that it expects to receive if it produces the good offshore:

$$E \left[\frac{p_{hhh}^{dom}}{p_{hih}^{offshore}} \right] = \frac{c_h/E[\phi_{hh}]}{c_i/E[\phi_{ih}]} \frac{1}{d_{hi}} = \frac{c_h}{c_i} \Psi_{ih}^{1/\theta} \frac{1}{d_{hi}}. \quad (23)$$

Table 15 shows this ratio for all country pairs. All the relative expected prices are significantly less than one, meaning that domestic production is on average much cheaper than offshoring for all countries. The best chance that offshoring may produce a lower price exists between the U.S. and Canada where NAFTA helps to make implementation factors high and trade costs low. Since the relative expected prices are less than one, producers will only engage in offshoring if their foreign implementation factor draw relative to their home implementation factor draw, $\phi_{ih}(j)/\phi_{hh}(j)$, is better (greater) than average.

³⁸While the labor compensation in Canada, Europe, Japan, and the U.S. is 7 to 10 times greater than in the ROW, it constitutes only 20% of the cost of production. Since the prices of capital and intermediate goods are fairly similar in all countries, the differences in the costs of production are not as great; There is certainly anecdotal evidence that operating in the U.S. is not much more expensive than operating in China (which dominates the ROW data). For example, an article in the L.A. Times (Lee (2008)) tells a story of a Chinese businessman opening a printing-plate factory in South Carolina. He explains that land costs less than 1/4 of what it does in southeast China, electricity rates are about 75% lower, and there are no blackouts. While the South Carolina labor costs are higher (\$12-13/hr vs. \$2/hr), they are partially offset by payroll tax credits from the state government (the differences in land costs, electricity costs, and tax incentives are captured in the model by the differences in the expected implementation factors). The bottom line? "I was surprised," said the businessman. "The gap is not as large as I thought."

5 Measuring technology diffusion

This section will measure the extent of technology diffusion due to international production. It will be done by comparing the technology parameters Λ_h estimated above with the technology parameters of the Eaton-Kortum model. The Eaton-Kortum model assumes that there is no FDI or technology diffusion so that all producers manufacturing in country i draw productivity from that country's technology distribution. Specifically, the producer of good j in country i draws its production productivity $z_i(j)$ from the productivity distribution of country i that has the Fréchet form with the location parameter T_i and shaping parameter θ (common to all countries).

As in the model of this paper, the producer of good j in country i can bring its good to country n at a cost d_{ni} . Among all the producers of good j (in various countries), only the producer that offers the cheapest price succeeds in selling its good in country n . Given this setup, Eaton and Kortum derive the expression for bilateral trade:

$$\pi_{ni} = \frac{T_i (c_i d_{ni})^{-\theta}}{\sum_s T_s (c_s d_{ni})^{-\theta}}, \quad (24)$$

where π_{ni} , c_i , and d_{ni} have the same meanings as in this paper. Eaton and Kortum assume that labor is the only factor of production, but for compatibility purposes we will modify their model and assume that capital and labor are the factors of production, so that c_i is given by (1):

$$c_i = r_i^\alpha w_i^\beta p_i^{1-\alpha-\beta}, \quad (25)$$

Eaton and Kortum derive the price index for their model:

$$p_i = \gamma \left[\sum_s T_s (c_s d_{ni})^{-\theta} \right]^{-1/\theta}, \quad (26)$$

where γ is a constant. The market clearing conditions in Eaton and Kortum and the model of this paper are the same, given by equations (9)-(12).

We can infer the values of the technology parameters T_i from the same data used in the previous section to infer the parameters of the model of this paper. Of course, the data on the activity of foreign affiliates will not be needed since the Eaton-Kortum model does not have FDI. Also, since we want to focus on the estimates of the technology parameters, we will use the trade costs d_{ni} estimated in the previous section instead of using the Eaton-Kortum methodology of estimating them.³⁹ To infer the technology parameters T_i , we will use the market clearing equation (9):

$$Q_i = \sum_{n=1}^N \pi_{ni} X_n \quad (27)$$

with π_{ni} given by (24), c_i by (25), and p_i by (26). Equations (27) constitute a system of N equations of N unknown T_i 's. They are solved using data on output, spending, wages, and rates of return described in Section 3, and trade costs estimated in the previous section.

How would we expect T and Λ to be different? T_i is a measure of technology being used in production in country i (regardless of the source of this technology) while Λ_i is a measure of technology developed in country i . If there is no international production (and therefore no technology diffusion) then T and Λ should be the same. For small volumes of international production, their

³⁹They use a gravity-like equation to estimate the trade costs.

values should be similar. On the other hand, if a country has a low Λ , but many producers from high- Λ countries operating on its territory, we would expect its T to be noticeably higher than its Λ . As the volume of international production increases, we would expect T 's to become more and more similar across countries, while Λ 's would of course remain constant. In an extreme case, when international production is as easy as the domestic production (i.e. $\Psi = 1$ for all pairs of countries), we would expect T 's to be the same in all countries. Therefore, the difference between T 's and Λ 's gives us a measure of technology diffusion.

Table 16 presents each country's mean productivity inferred from the Eaton-Kortum model and normalized with respect to the United States. This mean productivity is calculated as $(T_i/T_{US})^{1/\theta}$.

The values of these mean productivities are very similar to the values of $(\Lambda_i/\Lambda_{US})^{1/\theta}$ shown in Table 8 with the exception of Canada, where T_{CAN} is higher than Λ_{CAN} . This result makes perfect sense in light of the discussion above.⁴⁰ As mentioned before, the present-day volumes of international production are fairly low for most countries.⁴¹ So for most countries the value of the parameter T is similar to the value of the parameter Λ . This is even the case for the ROW where own technology is low so the potential benefit from international production is high.

One notable exception in the dataset is Canada where, as shown on Table 6, 29% of the labor force is employed by foreign producers, mostly from the U.S. Therefore, T_{CAN} is noticeably higher than Λ_{CAN} . This difference implies a substantial technology transfer to Canada that we would expect to bring sizable welfare gains. Welfare gains from international production are analyzed in the Section 8.

As mentioned earlier, if international production is as easy as the domestic one, we would expect T 's to be the same in all countries. So, an interesting experiment would be to use the model of this paper to simulate a world in which international production is as easy as the domestic one and then use the Eaton-Kortum model to infer the T parameters in such a world. This experiment is done in Section 8.2.

6 Relationship between trade costs and implementation factors

What is the relationship between trade and international production? Are they complements or substitutes? On one hand, high volumes of trade and IP seem to be positively correlated in the data. Also, the ad-hoc gravity model seems to work relatively well for international production. Just as trade, international production is found to be decreasing in distance and increasing in language similarity (Brainard, 1997; Shatz, 2003). On the other hand, theory implies that horizontal IP increases with trade costs and evidence shows that horizontal IP is the prevalent type of IP.⁴²

The magnitudes of trade and IP costs play important roles in determining the volumes of trade and IP. This paper does not impose any a priori restrictions on these parameters. We will now check if and how the estimated values of these two key parameters are related.

⁴⁰This result also serves as a check of the model of this paper.

⁴¹In terms of fractions of labor forces employed by foreign affiliates, λ_{ih} .

⁴²This evidence includes the fact the most of the output of international production is sold locally (see Sections 4.2 and 4.3). Since local sales are usually interpreted as the result of horizontal FDI, their prevalence can be taken as evidence of prevalence of horizontal FDI. Irarrazabal, Moxnes and Oromolla (2008) reconcile the horizontal IP theory with gravity results by requiring foreign affiliates to buy intermediate inputs from the headquarters. Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2009) use a similar mechanism in their model, but still find that trade and IP are substitutes. The model of this paper imposes no such requirements on the affiliates. Instead, this Section explains that the gravity results and theory are not contradictory.

The results show that the trade costs d_{ni} and mean implementation factors $\Psi_{ni}^{1/\theta}$ are negatively correlated ($\rho = -0.58$).⁴³ They are plotted together on Figure 2. Since low implementation factors are a barrier to international production while high trade costs are a barrier to international trade, this result means that these two kinds of international barriers go hand-in-hand. The relatively high correlation between the two means that one can serve as a fairly accurate predictor of the other.⁴⁴

A possible explanation for high correlation between trade and investment barriers is that some of the factors that affect one also affect the other. This has been shown by the gravity literature mentioned above.⁴⁵ For example, physical proximity and common language decrease both types of barriers.⁴⁶ Another common determinant may be the quality of institutions. Government policy toward imports may be a subset of a more general policy toward openness that affects not only trade, but also foreign investment. For example, free-trade agreements often have provisions reducing foreign investment barriers.

The positive correlation between trade and investment barriers may explain why we typically observe simultaneous high volumes of trade and IP between pairs of countries. In general, the model of this paper predicts (as shown in Sections 7 and 8) that for a pair of countries trade and IP are substitutes in the sense that changing trade or IP barriers moves trade and IP in opposite directions.⁴⁷ The model does not include intra-firm trade, however, so this conclusion cannot be taken as the definitive answer to the question of whether trade and IP are substitutes or compliments.

It should also be noted that trade and IP being substitutes is not incompatible with the fact that high volumes of trade and IP between a pair of countries typically go hand-in-hand. It is possible that they go hand-in-hand because of a common cause (such as common language or a free-trade agreement) rather than one causing another. Section 7 will continue this analysis.

Finally, it is interesting to check if implementation factors are related to technology parameters. The results show that there is little or no correlation between the implementation factors and

⁴³The correlation coefficient excludes the diagonal entries.

⁴⁴The slope of the relationship between trade costs and implementation factors on Figure 1 is close to -1 . The relationship between trade costs and implementation factors tightens significantly if the country pairs involving ROW are excluded (ρ becomes -0.77).

⁴⁵The empirical literature on the determinants of FDI is reviewed in Blonigen (2005).

⁴⁶Keller and Yeaple (2009) show how distance may matter in IP activity.

⁴⁷There are several caveats to this finding. First, trade and IP are partial (weak) substitutes (Ramondo and Rodríguez-Clare (2009) get the same result, even though they require foreign affiliates to buy a portion of their intermediate goods from their home country). Second, even though trade and IP are substitutes on the net, there are both substitution and complementarity effects between the two. Trade and IP are substitutes because they are two alternative ways to serve foreign markets. The complementarity effects work through the output. For example, lower investment barriers increase output, which stimulates trade (including trade in intermediate goods) (Blonigen (2001) also finds evidence of complementarity and substitution effects between trade and FDI). Lower trade costs lead to higher output in both countries, including the output of the remaining foreign affiliates. However, these complementarity effects are smaller than the substitution effects. Third, trade and IP are substitutes in the sense that changing trade or IP barriers moves trade and IP in opposite directions. A change in another parameter may move trade and IP in the same direction. For example, increasing Λ_h leads to greater exports from h and greater IP by h affiliates (simulations results are available from the author upon request). Fourth, the prediction of the model regarding trade and IP being substitutes is for the existing levels of barriers to trade and investment. For example, if trade is free, then lowering barriers to international production increases IP, but does not decrease trade. Similarly, if there are no barriers to international production, then decreasing barriers to trade increases trade, but does not decrease international production.

technology parameters of the owner and host countries. This means that high-technology countries do not offer better implementation factors as hosts or face lower implementation factors as investors than the low-technology countries.

7 Free trade agreements and offshoring

It is often suggested that implementing a free-trade agreement (FTA) between a developed and developing country results in more offshoring by the developed country’s firms. Given cheap labor in the developing country and cheap costs of bringing the goods back to the developed country, firms would have an incentive to move their production to the developing country.

We can use the model that was developed and parametrized in the previous sections to simulate a free-trade agreement between the U.S. and ROW. We can then see if the model predicts greater offshoring as the result of this FTA.

To simulate a scenario means to solve for the endogenous variables π_{ni} , κ_{ih} , Q_n , X_n , w_n , r_n , and p_n given the model parameters K_n , L_n , Y_n^o , Λ_n , Ψ_{ih} , θ , d_{ni} , α , β , σ , and φ_n . The endogenous variables are found using equations (3), (5), (8)-(12), (17) and (19). All the equations that are used to simulate the model are also presented in Appendix C for convenience.

An FTA between the U.S. and ROW will be simulated by removing all trade costs between the U.S. and ROW. This is accomplished by solving the model with $d_{US,ROW}$ and $d_{ROW,US}$ set to one. Of course free-trade agreements do not result in completely free trade. They only remove the policy-related trade barriers. However, since the current levels of the policy-related trade barriers between the U.S. and ROW are not known, we will estimate the upper bound of the effects of a free-trade agreement by simulating completely free trade.

The model predicts all the usual consequences of a free-trade agreement: higher volume of trade, greater welfare in both countries. However, we are specifically interested in what happens to offshoring by the U.S. producers in the ROW. The results show that the sales to the U.S. of the U.S. affiliates producing in the ROW (i.e. $\chi_{US,ROW,US} \times X_{US}$) increase 10-fold (the share $\chi_{US,ROW,US}$ increases 8-fold). This is a substantial increase and seems to support the opponents of FTAs.⁴⁸

However, this increase in sales happens because the output of the existing U.S. affiliates in the ROW is redirected to the U.S. from other destinations, not because the U.S. firms move jobs to the ROW. In fact, the number of workers in the ROW that are employed by the U.S. firms decreases as some U.S. firms that were in the ROW in order to “jump” ROW’s tariffs move back to the U.S. The total output of the U.S. affiliates in the ROW shrinks by 25%. At the same time, the number of the U.S. workers employed by the U.S. firms increases. The ROW workers that are let go by the departing U.S. firms are picked up by the ROW firms and firms from Europe and Japan that increase their use of the ROW as an export platform into the U.S.

We can see that the output of the U.S. affiliates in the ROW is being redirected by looking at the fractions of this output that is sold in the U.S., ROW, and the other countries. The fraction of output sold in the U.S. increases 13-fold. At the same time, the fraction of output sold locally (in the ROW) decreases by nearly 50%. The fraction of output sold in the other countries (Canada, Japan, and Europe) increases slightly.

We can find out if this redirections of output happens in the real world as the result of an FTA

⁴⁸The U.S. affiliates in the ROW also increase their exports to the U.S. much more than the other affiliates in the ROW. For example, the ROW’s own domestic affiliates increase exports to the U.S. only 5-fold.

by looking at the historical data on the activity of the U.S. foreign affiliates.⁴⁹ When we look at the sales of the U.S. foreign affiliates in Mexico before and after NAFTA, we find the same redirection of output described above. We find that between 1993 and 2000, the proportion of output of the U.S. affiliates in Mexico sold in the U.S. has doubled, the fraction sold locally fell by 30%, and the fraction sold in other countries has increased.

Lets discuss a little further the relationship between trade and IP. As mentioned earlier, the model predicts that IP will decrease as the result of an FTA. This result is consistent with other simulations of the model (discussed in the next section) where IP and trade are also predicted to be substitutes (at the current levels of trade and investment barriers).

What does the existing empirical research say about the effects of FTAs on international production (or foreign direct investment since data on FDI is much more widely available than data on IP)? There are not many empirical studies that looked at the effects of FTAs on IP or FDI (at least compared to the number of studies that looked at the effects of FTAs on trade), but those that did look at this relationship found that foreign direct investment between countries increased when they signed a FTA (see, for example Yeyati, Stein and Daude (2003) and Baltagi, Egger and Pfaffermayr (2005)). Similarly, BEA data shows that the fraction of the Mexican manufacturing labor force employed by the U.S. affiliates has increased following implementation of NAFTA.

How can model predictions be reconciled with these empirical observations? First, it should be remembered that the model does not incorporate intra-firm trade that may be responsible for an increase in total trade after an increase in IP. Second, it is possible that an increase in FDI following an implementation of a FTA is due to FTA's provisions regarding foreign investment. Recent FTAs typically include strong provisions protecting investors from a variety of unfair treatment by host governments. For example, chapter 11 of NAFTA provides investors with substantive rights and adjudicatory mechanisms to enforce those rights. Typically, these provisions state that arbitration takes place outside of host countries (it can take place at the World Bank, UN, or another place), which is especially important when the host country is a developing country with a weak judicial system (Gantz, 2004).⁵⁰ These foreign investment provisions of FTAs decrease barriers to international investment, i.e. increase Ψ_{ih} , thereby increasing international production.

8 Gains from trade and international production

This section will investigate the welfare effects of international trade and production in manufactures. It will start by quantifying the welfare effects of the current levels of trade and international production. It will then investigate a counterfactual world in which there are no barriers to trade and international production is as easy as the domestic one.

8.1 Autarky

First, we will consider how much the current level of international trade in manufactures contributes to welfare. For this purpose, a counterfactual experiment will simulate an increase in trade costs d_{ni}

⁴⁹The source of this data is the BEA database on the activity of the U.S. foreign affiliates.

⁵⁰Countries can also enter into stand-alone (i.e. not part of FTAs) agreements that reduce investment barriers outside of the free-trade agreements. The examples include Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Double-Taxation Treaties (DTTs). The empirical evidence on the effects of BITs on FDI is mixed, though it seems that developing countries, especially those considered to have risky business environments, increase their FDI inflows by signing BITs (Neumayer and Spess, 2004; Swenson, 2005).

(while holding all other parameters constant at their baseline levels) to the point where international trade disappears. Welfare will be measured by real income.

The results of the experiment, presented in the first column of Table 17, show that the contribution of the current level of international trade to the current level of welfare varies between 0.5% in Japan and 4% in Canada. It is not surprising that the contribution of trade is the greatest in Canada: it currently spends a half of its income on foreign goods and sends a half of its output abroad. By comparison, Japan spends only 10% of its income on foreign goods and sends 20% of its output abroad. The numbers reported in the first column of Table 17 are similar to those presented in the fourth column of Table IX in Eaton and Kortum (2002).⁵¹

Next, we will consider how much the current level of international production in manufactures contributes to welfare. For this purpose, we will perform a counterfactual experiment that will simulate a decrease in implementation factors $\Psi_{ih,i \neq h}$ (while holding all the other parameters, including trade costs, constant at their baseline levels) to the point where international production disappears.⁵²

The results of this experiment are presented in the second column of Table 17. As with trade, Japan has the distinction of having the smallest contribution of international production to welfare at 0.05%, while Canada has the largest at 2.1%. It is not surprising that the contribution of IP is the largest in Canada, since it has the greatest presence of foreign producers on its soil. As discussed in Section 3, about 30% of Canadian labor force is employed by foreign producers (mostly from the U.S.) that make a noticeable contribution to the average productivity in Canada.

The contribution of international production to welfare is smaller than the contribution of trade by a factor of two for Canada, Europe, and the U.S., factor of six for the ROW, and factor of nine for Japan. This result is not unexpected given that the current levels of international production are fairly modest for most countries. For example, only 1.5% of Japanese workers are employed by foreign producers.

Finally, we will consider how much the current levels of both trade and international production in manufactures (jointly) contribute to welfare. For this purpose, a counterfactual experiment will simulate a simultaneous increase in trade costs d_{ni} and decrease in implementation factors $\Psi_{ih,i \neq h}$ to the point where both international trade and production disappear.

The combined welfare effects of international production and trade, i.e. the effects of openness, are presented in the third column of Table 17. The model predicts that Canada would see its welfare reduced by about 7% if its manufacturing sector were to become closed to trade and international production. Canada being a small fairly open economy, this result is not surprising. Europe, the U.S., and ROW would see their welfare reduced by 1.7-2.5%, Japan by 0.6%.

The welfare effect of both trade and international production is greater than the sum of the welfare effect of trade and the welfare effect of international production (i.e. column three of Table 17 is greater than the sum of columns one and two). This occurs because trade and IP are substitutes in the model. For example, when international trade is stopped, international production increases. Similarly, when international production is stopped, international trade increases.

⁵¹ Arkolakis, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2010) show that these gains from trade can be obtained from a large class of trade models.

⁵² Trade costs are held at their base values, presented in Table 11.

8.2 Open world

It is also interesting to quantify the potential benefits to having free trade and international production. Free trade exists when all international trade costs d_{ni} are equal to one, i.e. the same as the domestic trade costs. Free international production exists when all mean implementation factors $\Psi_{ih}^{1/\theta}$ are equal to one, i.e. the same as the domestic mean implementation factors. With free IP, technology is freely mobile across countries.

This section will simulate several scenarios: (a) a world in which trade is free, but the implementation factors are same as in the today's world, (b) a world in which international production is free, but the trade costs are the same as in the today's world, and (c) a fully open world in which both trade and international production are free.

The last three columns of Table 17 show the welfare changes that are predicted by these simulations. We note that the potential gains from free trade and international production are much greater than the welfare gains from the current levels of trade and international production.⁵³ All countries are predicted to reap substantial rewards from more openness.

The gain from free trade depends on country size and current trade magnitude. Canada, as a small country, has the most to gain from free trade. Japan, as the currently least-open country, also stands to gain substantially. The gain from free international production is related to the current level of domestic technology. The ROW, having domestic technology that is much less productive than the other countries', stands to gain by far the most. Free international production gives it a very large 90% increase in welfare. This shows that technology diffusion can be a source of significant economic growth. This is especially true for less developed countries, such as the ROW, that have low productivities of domestically-sources technologies.

Comparing the gains from free trade and international production, we can see that for the U.S., the gains are similar. For countries with productive domestic technologies, such as Japan, free trade is more beneficial than fully integrated international production. For countries with less productive domestic technologies, such as Europe and especially the ROW, free international production is more beneficial. Being a small country, Canada benefits greatly from free trade. However, having relatively less productive domestic technologies, it also benefits significantly from free international production.

The last column of Table 17 shows the predicted benefits of a completely open world, with free trade and international production. The numbers are quite large. The U.S. is predicted to see a 26% increase in its real income, Japan and Europe - 40-45% increase. Canada and the ROW are predicted to benefit the most: Canada stands to gain 110% while the ROW 118%. To put these numbers in perspective, consider that a 26% increase in real income can also be obtained from 8 years of a 3% annual economic growth. A 40-45% increase in real income can be obtained from 11.5-12.5 years of a 3% annual economic growth and a 110% increase - from 25 years.

Similarly to the case of autarky simulations of the previous section, the welfare effect of both free trade and international production is greater than the sum of the welfare effect of free trade and the welfare effect of free international production. As in those simulations, this occurs because trade and IP are substitutes in the model. For example, when international trade becomes free, international production decreases. Therefore, the liberalization of international production has a greater effect on the size of international production when trade is free than when it is costly. Similarly, when international production becomes free, international trade drops. Therefore, trade

⁵³Eaton and Kortum (2002) reach the same conclusion for international trade.

liberalization has a greater effect on the size of trade when international production is free than when it is costly.

Table 18 shows what happens to the ownership structure of foreign affiliates when international production becomes free (i.e. fully internationally integrated).⁵⁴ The ownership structure becomes the same in all countries. Producers from more productive countries get a bigger slice of production, those from less productive countries get a smaller slice. Japanese producers become responsible for 38% of total employment, the U.S. producers for 30%. On the other hand, Canadian producers get 8% of labor in each country and the ROW producers get 2%. Still, even 8% represents big gains for Canadian producers, as can be seen by comparing Tables 18 and 6.

Since with free international production the ownership structure is the same in all countries, the production productivities are also the same everywhere. This can be verified by using the Eaton-Kortum model to infer the technology parameters T_i in the world with free international production. The parameters are inferred using the procedure described in Section 5 and the simulated data on output, spending, wages, and rates of return for the world with free international production. As expected, the estimated technology parameters T_i are *exactly* the same in all countries. Therefore, the world with free international production is the world where technology has diffused completely throughout the world.

9 Conclusion

The paper develops a general equilibrium model of international production and trade. Producers develop technology at the headquarters in their home countries and can implement this technology in any country around the world. When searching for the location of production, producers consider the costs of production and the proximity to goods markets. Important features of the model include technological differences across producers, technology transfer through international production, and the presence of trade and investment costs. Technology transfer means that the technology used in production in each country is endogenous. The model produces two gravity-like equations: one for international trade and the other for international production.

The model is parametrized using data for five countries. Model parameters describe the states of technology in different countries, (asymmetric) barriers to international investment, and (asymmetric) trade costs. The model does not place any restrictions on the values of the barriers to international investment and trade. It is found that for the average producer the barriers to international production are greater than the barriers to domestic production. Similarly, the cost of international trade is greater than the cost of domestic trade.

The paper uses the Eaton-Kortum model to measure the extent of technology diffusion. The technology parameters of the model of this paper measure the states of technology developed in each country, whereas the technology parameters of the Eaton-Kortum model measure the states of technology being used in each country (regardless of origin). Comparing the two sets of technology parameters it is found that of the countries in the dataset only Canada uses a significant amount of foreign-developed technology.

The paper finds that the barriers to trade and international production are highly correlated, which is explained by the existence of many common causes of these two kinds of barriers. The common causes may include physical proximity, common language, quality of institutions, govern-

⁵⁴Regardless of whether the international trade is free or not.

ment policy, and inter-governmental agreements. The correlation between trade and investment barriers may explain why bilateral volumes of trade and IP are typically correlated.

The paper also studies the effects of a free-trade agreement between the ROW (a poor “country”) and the U.S. on offshoring by the U.S. producers. It finds that the main outcome of this FTA is the redirection of output of the U.S. affiliates in the ROW from local sales to exports to the U.S. It is shown that such redirection of output happened to the U.S. affiliates in Mexico after NAFTA was implemented. The presence of the U.S. affiliates in the ROW declines as the result of the FTA. The paper suggests that increases in IP observed subsequent to implementations of FTAs may be due to the FTAs’ provisions that reduce IP costs.

Finally, the model is used to quantify the welfare effects of international production and trade. The current level of international production contributes between 0.05 and 2.1% to the current level of welfare, depending on the country, while the current level of trade contributes between 0.5 and 4%. Moving to a world with free international production is estimated to increase welfare by 8-90% while moving to a world with free trade is estimated to increase welfare by 9-36%.

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Appendix A Proposition 1 with proof

Proposition 1 *The probability that a producer from h locates its manufacturing in i in order to supply n with j is*

$$\chi_{nih} = \left[\int_0^\infty \prod_{s \neq h} (1 - F_{ns}^p(p)) dF_{nh}^p(p) \right] \times \left[\int_0^\infty \prod_{s \neq i} (1 - F_{nsh}^v(v)) dF_{nih}^v(v) \right]. \quad (28)$$

Proof. The probability that a producer from h locates its manufacturing in i in order to supply n with j is $\chi_{nih} \equiv \Pr(A_{nih}) = \Pr(B_{nh} \cap C_{nih}) = \Pr(B_{nh}) \Pr(C_{nih})$, where event A_{nih} is “a producer from h locates its manufacturing in i in order to supply n with j ”, event B_{nh} is “a producer from h is the lowest-price supplier of j in n ”, and event C_{nih} is “country i provides the lowest cost to market n for a producer of j from h ”. The last equality holds because events B_{nh} and C_{nih} are independent.

Addressing events B_{nh} and C_{nih} individually, we have

$$\Pr(B_{nh}) = \Pr\left(p_{nh}(j) \leq \min_s \{p_{ns}(j), s \neq h\}\right) = \int_0^\infty \prod_{s \neq h} (1 - F_{ns}^p(p)) dF_{nh}^p(p). \quad (29)$$

The probability of the event C_{nih} is

$$\Pr(C_{nih}) = \Pr\left(v_{nih}(j) \leq \min_s \{v_{nsh}(j), s \neq i\}\right) = \int_0^\infty \prod_{s \neq i} (1 - F_{nsh}^v(v)) dF_{nih}^v(v). \quad (30)$$

The second equality holds because v_{nih} are independent across i . ■

Appendix B Proposition 2 with proof

Proposition 2 *The probability that a producer from h would establish production in i in order to supply n is given by*

$$\begin{aligned} \chi_{nih} &= 2^N \theta \tilde{\Psi}_{nih}^2 \tilde{\Psi}_{nh}^{-1} \Lambda_h \prod_{s \neq h} \left(\tilde{\Psi}_{is} \Lambda_s \right)^{1/2} \times \\ &\quad \times \int_0^\infty p^{\theta(N+1)/2-1} K_0 \left(2 \left(\tilde{\Psi}_{nh} \Lambda_h \right)^{1/2} p^{\theta/2} \right) \prod_{s \neq h} K_1 \left(2 \left(\tilde{\Psi}_{is} \Lambda_s \right)^{1/2} p^{\theta/2} \right) dp. \end{aligned} \quad (31)$$

Proof. The probability that an h producer located in i is the lowest-price supplier of j in n (event B_{nh}) is

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(B_{nh}) &= \int_0^\infty \prod_{s \neq h} (1 - F_{ns}^p(p)) dF_{nh}^p(p) = \\ &= \int_0^\infty \prod_{s \neq h} \left(1 - R\left(p; \theta, \theta, \tilde{\Psi}_{is}, \Lambda_s\right) \right) dR\left(p; \theta, \theta, \tilde{\Psi}_{nh}, \Lambda_h\right). \end{aligned} \quad (32)$$

The probability that country i provides a producer from h with the lowest cost to market n (event C_{nih}) is

$$\Pr(C_{nih}) = \int_0^\infty \prod_{s \neq i} (1 - F_{nsh}^v(v)) dF_{nih}^v(v) = \frac{\Psi_{ih} (c_i d_{ni})^{-\mu}}{\sum_{s=1}^N \Psi_{sh} (c_s d_{ns})^{-\mu}} = \frac{\tilde{\Psi}_{nih}}{\sum_{s=1}^N \tilde{\Psi}_{nsh}} = \tilde{\Psi}_{nih} \tilde{\Psi}_{nh}^{-1}, \quad (33)$$

where $\tilde{\Psi}_{nh} = \sum_s \tilde{\Psi}_{nsh}$.

Therefore, the probability that a producer from h would establish production in i in order to supply n is given by the following integral equation:

$$\chi_{nih} = \tilde{\Psi}_{nih} \check{\Psi}_{nh}^{-1} \int_0^\infty \left[\prod_{s \neq h} \left(1 - R(p; \theta, \theta, \check{\Psi}_{is}, \Lambda_s) \right) \right] r(p; \theta, \theta, \check{\Psi}_{nh}, \Lambda_h) dp. \quad (34)$$

Plugging in the expressions for the cdf and pdf of p , this equation becomes

$$\begin{aligned} \chi_{nih} &= \tilde{\Psi}_{nih} \check{\Psi}_{nh}^{-1} \int_0^\infty \left[\prod_{s \neq h} 2 \left(\check{\Psi}_{is} \Lambda_s \right)^{1/2} p^{\theta/2} K_1 \left(2 \left(\check{\Psi}_{is} \Lambda_s \right)^{1/2} p^{\theta/2} \right) \right] \times \\ &\quad \times 2 \tilde{\Psi}_{nih} \Lambda_h \theta p^{\theta-1} K_0 \left(2 \left(\check{\Psi}_{nh} \Lambda_h \right)^{1/2} p^{\theta/2} \right) dp, \end{aligned} \quad (35)$$

which simplifies to (31) that can be evaluated numerically. The integral converges, as explained below equation (4). ■

Appendix C Summary of the equations that are used to simulate the model

Simulating the model means to solve for the endogenous variables π_{ni} , κ_{ih} , Q_n , X_n , w_n , r_n , and p_n given the model parameters K_n , L_n , Y_n^o , Λ_n , Ψ_{ih} , θ , d_{ni} , α , β , σ , and φ_n . The endogenous variables are found using equations (5), (8)-(12), and (3) reproduced below for convenience:

$$\pi_{ni} = \sum_h \chi_{nih}, \quad n \neq i, \quad (36)$$

$$\kappa_{ih} = \frac{\sum_n (\chi_{nih} X_n)}{Q_i}, \quad i \neq h, \quad (37)$$

$$Q_i = \sum_{n=1}^N \pi_{ni} X_n, \quad (38)$$

$$X_n = (1 - \alpha - \beta) Q_n + \varphi_n (w_n L_n + r_n K_n + Y_n^o), \quad (39)$$

$$r_i = \alpha Q_i / K_i, \quad w_i = \beta Q_i / L_i, \quad \text{and} \quad (40)$$

$$p_n = \left[\int_0^\infty p^{1-\sigma} dF_n^p(p) \right]^{1/(1-\sigma)}, \quad (41)$$

where χ_{nih} is given by (19):

$$\begin{aligned} \chi_{nih} &= 2^N \theta \tilde{\Psi}_{nih}^2 \check{\Psi}_{nh}^{-1} \Lambda_h \prod_{s \neq h} \left(\check{\Psi}_{is} \Lambda_s \right)^{1/2} \times \\ &\quad \times \int_0^\infty p^{\theta(N+1)/2-1} K_0 \left(2 \left(\check{\Psi}_{nh} \Lambda_h \right)^{1/2} p^{\theta/2} \right) \prod_{s \neq h} K_1 \left(2 \left(\check{\Psi}_{is} \Lambda_s \right)^{1/2} p^{\theta/2} \right) dp, \end{aligned} \quad (42)$$

with $\tilde{\Psi}_{nih} = \Psi_{ih} \left(r_i^\alpha w_i^\beta p_i^{1-\alpha-\beta} d_{ni} \right)^{-\theta}$, $\check{\Psi}_{nh} = \sum_s \tilde{\Psi}_{nsh}$ as defined earlier, and the cdf of prices given by (17):

$$F_n^p(p) = 1 - \prod_s 2 \left(\check{\Psi}_{ns} \Lambda_s \right)^{1/2} p^{\theta/2} K_1 \left(2 \left(\check{\Psi}_{ns} \Lambda_s \right)^{1/2} p^{\theta/2} \right). \quad (43)$$

Table 1 Country data

	units	Canada	Europe	Japan	US	ROW
Manuf. imports	Bil. USD	193	782	220	895	1,308
Manuf. exports	Bil. USD	194	885	424	651	1,243
Manuf. output	Bil. USD	366	3,511	2,300	3,466	4,421
Spending on manufactures ⁽¹⁾	Bil. USD	365	3,408	2,096	3,709	4,485
Total GDP	Bil. USD	738	6,774	4,676	9,839	8,938
Compensation per worker	USD	34,367	33,234	39,236	48,201	4,861

⁽¹⁾Spending is calculated as output plus imports minus exports

Table 2 Trade (billions USD)

	Canada	Europe	Japan	US	ROW
Canada	172	15	8	140	29
Europe	9	2,626	52	105	617
Japan	4	30	1,876	52	133
U.S.	164	146	122	2,815	464
ROW	17	694	242	354	3,178

Note: importing countries are in rows while exporting countries are in columns.

Table entries show how much the importing country spends on goods from each of the exporting countries. Spending on domestic goods is shown on the diagonal.

Table 3 Trade (as a fraction of importer's spending)

	Canada	Europe	Japan	US	ROW
Canada	0.471	0.041	0.022	0.384	0.081
Europe	0.003	0.771	0.015	0.031	0.181
Japan	0.002	0.014	0.895	0.025	0.064
U.S.	0.044	0.039	0.033	0.759	0.125
ROW	0.004	0.155	0.054	0.079	0.708

Note: importing countries are in rows while exporting countries are in columns.

Table entries show how much the importing country spends on goods from each of the exporting countries as a fraction of its total spending. Spending on domestic goods is shown on the diagonal. By design, each row adds up to one.

Table 4 Trade (as a fraction of exporter's output)

	Canada	Europe	Japan	US	ROW
Canada	0.470	0.004	0.004	0.040	0.007
Europe	0.024	0.748	0.023	0.030	0.140
Japan	0.012	0.009	0.815	0.015	0.030
U.S.	0.447	0.042	0.053	0.812	0.105
ROW	0.047	0.198	0.105	0.102	0.719

Note: importing countries are in rows while exporting countries are in columns.

Table entries show how much the exporting country sends to each of the importing countries as a fraction of its total output. Revenue from domestic sales is shown on the diagonal. By design, each column adds up to one.

Table 5 Employment by location and ownership

	Canada	Europe	Japan	US	ROW
Canada	1,412	122	18	414	21
Europe	72	19,547	127	1,216	884
Japan	2	44	8,806	69	19
U.S.	167	946	355	13,643	533
ROW	192	3,694	1,501	2,451	113,549

Note: host countries are in rows while owner countries are in columns.

Table 6 Employment by location and ownership
(as a fraction of total employment in each country)

	Canada	Europe	Japan	US	ROW
Canada	0.711	0.062	0.009	0.208	0.011
Europe	0.003	0.895	0.006	0.056	0.040
Japan	0.000	0.005	0.985	0.008	0.002
U.S.	0.011	0.060	0.023	0.872	0.034
ROW	0.002	0.030	0.012	0.020	0.935

Note: host countries are in rows while owner countries are in columns.

By design, each row adds up to one.

Table 7 Employment by location and ownership
(as a fraction of total employment by each country's firms)

	Canada	Europe	Japan	US	ROW
Canada	0.765	0.005	0.002	0.023	0.000
Europe	0.039	0.803	0.012	0.068	0.008
Japan	0.001	0.002	0.815	0.004	0.000
U.S.	0.091	0.039	0.033	0.767	0.005
ROW	0.104	0.152	0.139	0.138	0.987

Note: host countries are in rows while owner countries are in columns.

By design, each column adds up to one.

Table 8 Mean blueprint productivities, $(\Lambda_b/\Lambda_{US})^{1/\theta}$

	Value
Canada	0.80
Europe	0.95
Japan	1.05
U.S.	1
ROW	0.65

Table 9 Mean implementation factors, $(\Psi_{ih})^{1/\theta}$

	Canada	Europe	Japan	U.S.	ROW
Canada	1	0.62	0.43	0.74	0.73
Europe	0.49	1	0.42	0.61	0.95
Japan	0.37	0.49	1	0.49	0.67
U.S.	0.64	0.69	0.54	1	0.96
ROW	0.31	0.42	0.32	0.37	1

Note: host countries are in rows, owner countries are in columns

Table 10 Production productivities of producers that draw mean productivities and mean implementation factors, $(\Psi_{ih}\Lambda_b/\Lambda_{US})^{1/\theta}$

	Canada	Europe	Japan	U.S.	ROW
Canada	0.80	0.58	0.44	0.74	0.47
Europe	0.39	0.95	0.44	0.61	0.62
Japan	0.30	0.46	1.05	0.49	0.43
U.S.	0.51	0.66	0.57	1.00	0.62
ROW	0.24	0.40	0.34	0.37	0.65

Note: host countries are in rows, owner countries are in columns

Table 11 Trade costs (d_{ni})

	Canada	Europe	Japan	U.S.	ROW
Canada	1	1.75	2.22	1.17	1.57
Europe	1.96	1	2.14	1.57	1.24
Japan	1.91	1.77	1	1.54	1.38
U.S.	1.35	1.68	1.99	1	1.39
ROW	1.89	1.33	1.79	1.40	1

Note: importer countries are in rows, exporter countries are in columns

Table 12 Calculated macroeconomic variables

	Canada	Europe	Japan	U.S.	ROW
Labor force, L_i , mil.	2.08	20.60	11.43	14.02	177.34
Capital stock, K_i , tril. USD	0.19	1.84	1.21	1.82	2.32
Share of manufacturing in country spending, ϕ_i	0.15	0.14	0.10	0.13	0.16

Figure 1 Local sales as a percentage of the total sales of the U.S. affiliates




Table 13 Relative costs of production, c_h/c_i

	Canada	Europe	Japan	U.S.	ROW
Canada	1	0.92	0.89	1.03	0.64
Europe	1.09	1	0.97	1.12	0.70
Japan	1.12	1.03	1	1.15	0.72
U.S.	0.98	0.90	0.87	1	0.62
ROW	1.56	1.44	1.39	1.60	1

Note: host countries (i) are in rows, owner countries (h) are in columns

Table 14 Expected price from exporting relative to international production

	Canada	Europe	Japan	U.S.	ROW
Canada	1	0.99	0.84	0.89	0.74
Europe	1.05	1	0.88	1.07	0.82
Japan	0.79	0.89	1	0.88	0.66
U.S.	0.84	1.04	0.93	1	0.84
ROW	0.90	0.80	0.81	0.83	1

Note: host/importing countries are in rows, owner/exporting countries are in columns

Table 15 Expected price from domestic production relative to offshoring


	Canada	Europe	Japan	U.S.	ROW
Canada	1	0.29	0.20	0.56	0.25
Europe	0.31	1	0.23	0.41	0.50
Japan	0.19	0.23	1	0.29	0.27
U.S.	0.53	0.40	0.30	1	0.43
ROW	0.30	0.49	0.33	0.43	1

Note: offshore hosting countries are in rows, owner (home) countries are in columns

Table 16 Mean productivities inferred using the Eaton-Kortum model, $(T_h/T_{US})^{1/\theta}$

	Value
Canada	0.88
Europe	0.95
Japan	1.04
U.S.	1
ROW	0.65

Figure 2 Trade costs vs. mean implementation factors



Note: the correlation is -0.58 and the slope is close to -1. The correlation becomes -0.77 if the country pairs involving ROW are excluded.

Table 17 Welfare effects

	Autarky			Open world		
	No trade	No IP	Complete	Free trade	Free IP	Both
Canada	-4.03%	-2.09%	-7.14%	35.63%	22.94%	109.50%
Europe	-1.50%	-0.66%	-2.48%	12.85%	17.61%	45.18%
Japan	-0.51%	-0.05%	-0.62%	17.69%	8.93%	40.48%
U.S.	-1.05%	-0.55%	-1.73%	9.14%	7.98%	26.23%
ROW	-1.94%	-0.34%	-2.53%	9.89%	89.98%	118.11%

Table 18 Employment by location and ownership with free IP
(as a fraction of total employment in each country)

	Canada	Europe	Japan	US	ROW
Canada	0.08	0.22	0.38	0.30	0.02
Europe	0.08	0.22	0.38	0.30	0.02
Japan	0.08	0.22	0.38	0.30	0.02
U.S.	0.08	0.22	0.38	0.30	0.02
ROW	0.08	0.22	0.38	0.30	0.02

Note: host countries are in rows, owner countries are in columns.
By design, each row adds up to one.